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Source-channel secrecy with causal disclosure

Author(s): Schieler, Curt; Song, Eva C; Cuff, Paul; Poor, H Vincent

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dc.contributor.authorSchieler, Curt-
dc.contributor.authorSong, Eva C-
dc.contributor.authorCuff, Paul-
dc.contributor.authorPoor, H Vincent-
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-11T15:11:16Z-
dc.date.available2024-01-11T15:11:16Z-
dc.date.issued2012-10en_US
dc.identifier.citationSchieler, Curt, Song, Eva C, Cuff, Paul, Poor, H Vincent. (2012). Source-channel secrecy with causal disclosure. 2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 10.1109/allerton.2012.6483323en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/pr19w08z7d-
dc.description.abstractImperfect secrecy in communication systems is investigated. Instead of using equivocation as a measure of secrecy, the distortion that an eavesdropper incurs in producing an estimate of the source sequence is examined. The communication system consists of a source and a broadcast (wiretap) channel, and lossless reproduction of the source sequence at the legitimate receiver is required. A key aspect of this model is that the eavesdropper's actions are allowed to depend on the past behavior of the system. Achievability results are obtained by studying the performance of source and channel coding operations separately, and then linking them together digitally. Although the problem addressed here has been solved when the secrecy resource is shared secret key, it is found that substituting secret key for a wiretap channel brings new insights and challenges: the notion of weak secrecy provides just as much distortion at the eavesdropper as strong secrecy, and revealing public messages freely is detrimental.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartof2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)en_US
dc.rightsAuthor's manuscripten_US
dc.titleSource-channel secrecy with causal disclosureen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.identifier.doidoi:10.1109/allerton.2012.6483323-
pu.type.symplectichttp://www.symplectic.co.uk/publications/atom-terms/1.0/journal-articleen_US

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