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Parameter-Hiding Order Revealing Encryption

Author(s): Cash, David; Liu, Feng-Hao; O’Neill, Adam; Zhandry, Mark; Zhang, Cong

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dc.contributor.authorCash, David-
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Feng-Hao-
dc.contributor.authorO’Neill, Adam-
dc.contributor.authorZhandry, Mark-
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Cong-
dc.identifier.citationCash, David, Feng-Hao Liu, Adam O’Neill, Mark Zhandry, and Cong Zhang. "Parameter-Hiding Order Revealing Encryption." In International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security (2018): pp. 181-210. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03326-2_7en_US
dc.description.abstractOrder-revealing encryption (ORE) is a primitive for outsourcing encrypted databases which allows for efficiently performing range queries over encrypted data. Unfortunately, a series of works, starting with Naveed et al. (CCS 2015), have shown that when the adversary has a good estimate of the distribution of the data, ORE provides little protection. In this work, we consider the case that the database entries are drawn identically and independently from a distribution of known shape, but for which the mean and variance are not (and thus the attacks of Naveed et al. do not apply). We define a new notion of security for ORE, called parameter-hiding ORE, which maintains the secrecy of these parameters. We give a construction of ORE satisfying our new definition from bilinear maps.en_US
dc.format.extent181 - 210en_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Securityen_US
dc.rightsAuthor's manuscripten_US
dc.titleParameter-Hiding Order Revealing Encryptionen_US
dc.typeConference Articleen_US

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