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|Abstract:||© 2016 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Exploiting regression discontinuity designs in Brazilian, Indian, and Canadian first-past-the-post elections, we document that second-place candidates are substantially more likely than close third-place candidates to run in, and win, subsequent elections. Since both candidates lost the election and had similar electoral performance, this is the effect of being labeled the runner-up. Selection into candidacy is unlikely to explain the effect on winning subsequent elections, and we find no effect of finishing in third place versus fourth place. We develop a simple model of strategic coordination by voters that rationalizes the results and provides further predictions that are supported by the data.|
|Citation:||Anagol, S, Fujiwara, T. (2016). The runner-up effect. Journal of Political Economy, 124 (4), 927 - 991. doi:10.1086/686746|
|Pages:||927 - 991|
|Type of Material:||Journal Article|
|Journal/Proceeding Title:||Journal of Political Economy|
|Version:||Final published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.|
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