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|Abstract:||In the first part of the paper I reconstruct Kant’s proof of the existence of a ‘most real being’ while also highlighting the theory of modality that motivates Kant’s departure from Leibniz’s version of the proof. I go on to argue that it is precisely this departure that makes the being that falls out of the pre-critical proof look more like Spinoza’s extended natura naturans than an independent, personal creator-God. In the critical period, Kant seems to think that transcendental idealism allows him to avoid this conclusion, but in the last section of the paper I argue that there is still one important version of the Spinozistic threat that remains.|
|Citation:||Chignell, Andrew. "Kant, Real Possibility, and the Threat of Spinoza." Mind 121, no. 483 (2012): 635-675.|
|Pages:||635 - 675|
|Type of Material:||Journal Article|
|Version:||Final published version. This is an open access article.|
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