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Kant, Real Possibility, and the Threat of Spinoza

Author(s): Chignell, Andrew

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Abstract: In the first part of the paper I reconstruct Kant’s proof of the existence of a ‘most real being’ while also highlighting the theory of modality that motivates Kant’s departure from Leibniz’s version of the proof. I go on to argue that it is precisely this departure that makes the being that falls out of the pre-critical proof look more like Spinoza’s extended natura naturans than an independent, personal creator-God. In the critical period, Kant seems to think that transcendental idealism allows him to avoid this conclusion, but in the last section of the paper I argue that there is still one important version of the Spinozistic threat that remains.
Publication Date: Jul-2012
Citation: Chignell, Andrew. "Kant, Real Possibility, and the Threat of Spinoza." Mind 121, no. 483 (2012): 635-675.
DOI: doi:10.1093/mind/fzs079
ISSN: 0026-4423
Pages: 635 - 675
Language: English
Type of Material: Journal Article
Journal/Proceeding Title: Mind
Version: Final published version. This is an open access article.

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