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Energy Storage Sharing in Smart Grid: A Modified Auction-Based Approach

Author(s): Tushar, Wayes; Chai, Bo; Yuen, Chau; Huang, Shisheng; Smith, David B; et al

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dc.contributor.authorTushar, Wayes-
dc.contributor.authorChai, Bo-
dc.contributor.authorYuen, Chau-
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Shisheng-
dc.contributor.authorSmith, David B-
dc.contributor.authorPoor, H Vincent-
dc.contributor.authorYang, Zaiyue-
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-11T20:42:43Z-
dc.date.available2024-01-11T20:42:43Z-
dc.date.issued2016-01-20en_US
dc.identifier.citationTushar, Wayes, Chai, Bo, Yuen, Chau, Huang, Shisheng, Smith, David B, Poor, H Vincent, Yang, Zaiyue. (2016). Energy Storage Sharing in Smart Grid: A Modified Auction-Based Approach. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 7 (3), 1462 - 1475. doi:10.1109/tsg.2015.2512267en_US
dc.identifier.issn1949-3053-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/pr1qv3c412-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the solution of joint energy storage (ES) ownership sharing between multiple shared facility controllers (SFCs) and those dwelling in a residential community. The main objective is to enable the residential units (RUs) to decide on the fraction of their ES capacity that they want to share with the SFCs of the community in order to assist them in storing electricity, e.g., for fulfilling the demand of various shared facilities. To this end, a modified auction-based mechanism is designed that captures the interaction between the SFCs and the RUs so as to determine the auction price and the allocation of ES shared by the RUs that governs the proposed joint ES ownership. The fraction of the capacity of the storage that each RU decides to put into the market to share with the SFCs and the auction price are determined by a noncooperative Stackelberg game formulated between the RUs and the auctioneer. It is shown that the proposed auction possesses the incentive compatibility and the individual rationality properties, which are leveraged via the unique Stackelberg equilibrium solution of the game. Numerical experiments are provided to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.en_US
dc.format.extent1462 - 1475en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE Transactions on Smart Griden_US
dc.rightsAuthor's manuscripten_US
dc.titleEnergy Storage Sharing in Smart Grid: A Modified Auction-Based Approachen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.identifier.doidoi:10.1109/tsg.2015.2512267-
dc.identifier.eissn1949-3061-
pu.type.symplectichttp://www.symplectic.co.uk/publications/atom-terms/1.0/journal-articleen_US

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