Skip to main content

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Competitive Influence in Networks

Author(s): Borodin, A; Braverman, Mark; Lucier, B; Oren, J

To refer to this page use:
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBorodin, A-
dc.contributor.authorBraverman, Mark-
dc.contributor.authorLucier, B-
dc.contributor.authorOren, J-
dc.identifier.citationBorodin, A, Braverman, M, Lucier, B, Oren, J. (2017). Strategyproof Mechanisms for Competitive Influence in Networks. Algorithmica, 78 (425 - 452. doi:10.1007/s00453-016-0169-0en_US
dc.description.abstractMotivated by applications to word-of-mouth advertising, we consider a game-theoretic scenario in which competing advertisers want to target initial adopters in a social network. Each advertiser wishes to maximize the resulting cascade of influence, modeled by a general network diffusion process. However, competition between products may adversely impact the rate of adoption for any given firm. The resulting framework gives rise to complex preferences that depend on the specifics of the stochastic diffusion model and the network topology. We study this model from the perspective of a central mechanism, such as a social networking platform, that can optimize seed placement as a service for the advertisers. We ask: given the reported budgets of the competing firms, how should a mechanism choose seeds to maximize overall efficiency? Beyond the algorithmic problem, competition raises issues of strategic behaviour: rational agents should be incentivized to truthfully report their advertising budget. For a general class of influence spread models, we show that when there are two players, the social welfare can be ee−1-approximated by a polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism. Our mechanism uses a dynamic programming procedure to randomize the order in which advertisers are allocated seeds according to a greedy method. For three or more players, we demonstrate that under an additional assumption (satisfied by many existing models of influence spread) there exists a simpler strategyproof ee−1-approximation mechanism; notably, this natural greedy mechanism is not necessarily strategyproof when there are only two players.en_US
dc.format.extent425 - 452en_US
dc.rightsAuthor's manuscripten_US
dc.titleStrategyproof Mechanisms for Competitive Influence in Networksen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Competitive Influence in Networks.pdf452.85 kBAdobe PDFView/Download

Items in OAR@Princeton are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.