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Stability in large matching markets with complementarities

Author(s): Ashlagi, I; Braverman, Mark; Hassidim, A

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Abstract: Labor markets can often be viewed as many-to-one matching markets. It is well known that if complementarities are present in such markets, a stable matching may not exist. We study large random matching markets with couples. We introduce a new matching algorithm and show that if the number of couples grows slower than the size of the market, a stable matching will be found with high probability. If however, the number of couples grows at a linear rate, with constant probability (not depending on the market size), no stable matching exists. Our results explain data from the market for psychology interns.
Publication Date: 13-Jun-2014
Electronic Publication Date: 13-Jun-2014
Citation: Ashlagi, I, Braverman, M, Hassidim, A. (2014). Stability in large matching markets with complementarities. Operations Research, 62 (713 - 732. doi:10.1287/opre.2014.1276
DOI: doi:10.1287/opre.2014.1276
Pages: 713 - 732
Type of Material: Journal Article
Journal/Proceeding Title: Operations Research
Version: Author's manuscript

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