Child-Support Laws and Contraceptive Care

Author(s): Irwin, Timothy

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Irwin, Timothy	-
dc.date.accessioned	2023-01-17T19:14:39Z	-
dc.date.available	2023-01-17T19:14:39Z	-
dc.date.issued	1995	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/pr1nk36502	-
dc.description.abstract	The paper uses a simple theoretical model of potential parents' contraceptive decisions to analyze the effects of different child-support laws on contraceptive care, the probability of accidental pregnancy, and the distribution of welfare. Among other things, the model implies that under noncooperative contraceptive decision making the rules of paternal, maternal, and joint liability are all inefficient, while a combination of a liability rule and a tax is efficient. Under cooperative contraceptive decision making, it shows that the effects of these rules are reversed: the combination of liability rule and tax is inefficient, while the others are all efficient.	en_US
dc.format.extent	47-59	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Public and International Affairs	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Volume 6;	-
dc.rights	Final published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.	en_US
dc.title	Child-Support Laws and Contraceptive Care	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US

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