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Prioritizing Consumers in Smart Grid: A Game Theoretic Approach

Author(s): Tushar, Wayes; Zhang, Jian A; Smith, David B; Poor, H Vincent; Thiebaux, Sylvie

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Abstract: This paper proposes an energy management technique for a consumer-to-grid system in smart grid. The benefit to consumers is made the primary concern to encourage consumers to participate voluntarily in energy trading with the central power station (CPS) in situations of energy deficiency. A novel system model motivating energy trading under the goal of social optimality is proposed. A single-leader multiple-follower Stackelberg game is then studied to model the interactions between the CPS and a number of energy consumers (ECs), and to find optimal distributed solutions for the optimization problem based on the system model. The CPS is considered as a leader seeking to minimize its total cost of buying energy from the ECs, and the ECs are the followers who decide on how much energy they will sell to the CPS for maximizing their utilities. It is shown that the game, which can be implemented distributedly, possesses a socially optimal solution, in which the sum of the benefits to all consumers is maximized, as the total cost to the CPS is minimized. Numerical analysis confirms the effectiveness of the game.
Publication Date: 11-Apr-2014
Citation: Tushar, Wayes, Zhang, Jian A, Smith, David B, Poor, H Vincent, Thiebaux, Sylvie. (2014). Prioritizing Consumers in Smart Grid: A Game Theoretic Approach. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 5 (3), 1429 - 1438. doi:10.1109/tsg.2013.2293755
DOI: doi:10.1109/tsg.2013.2293755
ISSN: 1949-3053
EISSN: 1949-3061
Pages: 1429 - 1438
Type of Material: Journal Article
Journal/Proceeding Title: IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Version: Author's manuscript

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