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Belief in Kant

Author(s): Chignell, Andrew

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Abstract: Most work in Kant’s epistemology focuses on what happens “upstream” from experience, prior to the formation of conscious propositional attitudes. By contrast, this essay focuses on what happens "downstream": the formation of assent (Fuerwahrhalten) in its various modes. The mode of assent that Kant calls "Belief" (Glaube) is the main topic: not only moral Belief but also "pragmatic" and "doctrinal" Belief as well. I argue that Kant’s discussion shows that we should reject standard accounts of the extent to which theoretical reason can provide justified assent about things-in-themselves, in favor of one that is much more liberal. Interpretive benefits are not the only results of the discussion, however. I also hope it will become clear along the way that there is such a thing as Kantian Belief, and that we often have quite a lot of it.
Publication Date: Jul-2007
Citation: Chignell, Andrew. "Belief in kant." The Philosophical Review 116, no. 3 (2007): 323-360.
ISSN: 0031-8108
Pages: 323 - 360
Language: English
Type of Material: Journal Article
Journal/Proceeding Title: The Philosophical Review
Version: Final published version. This is an open access article.

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