# Belief in Kant

## Author(s): Chignell, Andrew

To refer to this page use: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/pr19882m39
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChignell, Andrew-
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-25T14:49:32Z-
dc.date.available2022-01-25T14:49:32Z-
dc.date.issued2007-07en_US
dc.identifier.citationChignell, Andrew. "Belief in kant." The Philosophical Review 116, no. 3 (2007): 323-360.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0031-8108-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/pr19882m39-
dc.description.abstractMost work in Kant’s epistemology focuses on what happens “upstream” from experience, prior to the formation of conscious propositional attitudes. By contrast, this essay focuses on what happens "downstream": the formation of assent (Fuerwahrhalten) in its various modes. The mode of assent that Kant calls "Belief" (Glaube) is the main topic: not only moral Belief but also "pragmatic" and "doctrinal" Belief as well. I argue that Kant’s discussion shows that we should reject standard accounts of the extent to which theoretical reason can provide justified assent about things-in-themselves, in favor of one that is much more liberal. Interpretive benefits are not the only results of the discussion, however. I also hope it will become clear along the way that there is such a thing as Kantian Belief, and that we often have quite a lot of it.en_US
dc.format.extent323 - 360en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofThe Philosophical Reviewen_US
dc.rightsFinal published version. This is an open access article.en_US
dc.titleBelief in Kanten_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
pu.type.symplectichttp://www.symplectic.co.uk/publications/atom-terms/1.0/journal-articleen_US

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