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Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Author(s): Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen

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Abstract: A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an "information designer" who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We describe a unifying perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We extend information design to many player and relate it to the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium.
Publication Date: May-2016
Citation: Bergemann, Dirk, Morris, Stephen. (2016). Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 106 (5), 586 - 591. doi:10.1257/aer.p20161046
DOI: doi:10.1257/aer.p20161046
ISSN: 0002-8282
EISSN: 1944-7981
Pages: 586 - 591
Type of Material: Journal Article
Journal/Proceeding Title: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Version: Final published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.

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