# Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

## Author(s): Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen

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 Abstract: A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an "information designer" who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We describe a unifying perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We extend information design to many player and relate it to the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium. Publication Date: May-2016 Citation: Bergemann, Dirk, Morris, Stephen. (2016). Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 106 (5), 586 - 591. doi:10.1257/aer.p20161046 DOI: doi:10.1257/aer.p20161046 ISSN: 0002-8282 EISSN: 1944-7981 Pages: 586 - 591 Type of Material: Journal Article Journal/Proceeding Title: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Version: Final published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.