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An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring

Author(s): Abreu, Dilip J.; Sannikov, Yuliy

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dc.contributor.authorAbreu, Dilip J.-
dc.contributor.authorSannikov, Yuliy-
dc.date.accessioned2019-07-10T19:28:19Z-
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-01T15:50:37Z-
dc.date.available2019-07-10T19:28:19Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-01T15:50:37Z-
dc.date.issued2014-06-02en_US
dc.identifier.citationAbreu, D, Sannikov, Y. (2014). An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring. Theoretical Economics, 9 (2), 313 - 338. doi:10.3982/TE1302en_US
dc.identifier.issn1933-6837-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/pr16v3h-
dc.description.abstractConsider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency gains over the existing implementations of the algorithm from Abreu et al. (1990). These efficiency gains arise from a better understanding of the manner in which extreme points of the equilibrium payoff set are generated. An important theoretical implication of our algorithm is that the set of extreme points E of V* is finite. Indeed, |E| 3|A|, where A is the set of action profiles of the stage game. © 2014 Dilip Abreu and Yuliy Sannikov.en_US
dc.format.extent313 - 338en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofTheoretical Economicsen_US
dc.relation.replaceshttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/pr11f00-
dc.relation.replaces88435/pr11f00-
dc.rightsFinal published version. This is an open access article.en_US
dc.titleAn algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoringen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.identifier.doidoi:10.3982/TE1302-
dc.identifier.eissn1555-7561-
pu.type.symplectichttp://www.symplectic.co.uk/publications/atom-terms/1.0/journal-articleen_US

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