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|Abstract:||We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with n items facing a single buyer. We introduce the notion of symmetric menu complexity of a mechanism, which counts the number of distinct options the buyer may purchase, up to permutations of the items. Our main result is that a mechanism of quasi-polynomial symmetric menu complexity suffices to guarantee a (1 - epsilon )-approximation when the buyer is unit-demand over independent items, even when the value distribution is unbounded, and that this mechanism can be found in quasi-polynomial time. Our key technical result is a polynomial-time, (symmetric) menu-complexity-preserving black-box reduction from achieving a (1 - epsilon )-approximation for unbounded valuations that are subadditive over independent items to achieving a (1 - O(epsilon ))-approximation when the values are bounded (and still subadditive over independent items). We further apply this reduction to deduce approximation schemes for a suite of valuation classes beyond our main result. Finally, we show that selling separately (which has exponential menu complexity) can be approximated up to a (1 - epsilon ) factor with a menu of efficient-linear (f (epsilon) · n) symmetric menu complexity.|
|Citation:||Kothari, Pravesh, Sahil Singla, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, and S. Matthew Weinberg. "Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries." In IEEE 60th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS) (2019): pp. 220-232. doi:10.1109/FOCS.2019.00023|
|Pages:||220 - 232|
|Type of Material:||Conference Article|
|Journal/Proceeding Title:||IEEE 60th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)|
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