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|Abstract:||Does it ever happen that there are things we shouldn’t do and the reasons we shouldn’t do them are moral reasons, yet doing them is not morally wrong? Surprisingly, yes. I argue for a category that has not been recognized by moral theorists: morally permissible moral mistakes. Sometimes (but far from always) a supererogatory action is the thing a person should do; in failing to act, one makes a morally permissible moral mistake. Recognizing the category of morally permissible moral mistakes solves a puzzle about supererogation, expands the universe of possible moral views, and shows some apparently inconsistent moral views to be consistent.|
|Citation:||Harman, Elizabeth. "Morally permissible moral mistakes." Ethics 126, no. 2 (2016): 366-393.|
|Pages:||366 - 393|
|Type of Material:||Journal Article|
|Version:||Final published version. This is an open access article.|
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