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Revisiting the right to do wrong

Author(s): Bolinger, Renee

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DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBolinger, Renee-
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-25T14:49:03Z-
dc.date.available2022-01-25T14:49:03Z-
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.citationBolinger, Renee Jorgensen. "Revisiting the right to do wrong." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95, no. 1 (2017): 43-57.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0004-8402-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/pr1v574-
dc.description.abstractRights to do wrong are not necessary even within the framework of interest-based rights aimed at preserving autonomy (contra Waldron, Enoch, and Herstein). Agents can make morally significant choices and develop their moral character without a right to do wrong, so long as we allow that there can be moral variation within the set of actions that an agent is permitted to perform. Agents can also engage in non-trivial self-constitution in choosing between morally indifferent options, so long as there is adequate non-moral variation among the alternatives. The stubborn intuition that individuals have a right to do wrong in some cases can be explained as stemming from a cautionary principle motivated by the asymmetry between the risk of wrongly interfering and that of refraining from interfering.en_US
dc.format.extent43 - 57en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofAustralasian Journal of Philosophyen_US
dc.rightsFinal published version. This is an open access article.en_US
dc.titleRevisiting the right to do wrongen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
pu.type.symplectichttp://www.symplectic.co.uk/publications/atom-terms/1.0/journal-articleen_US

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