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Dreams, Nightmares, and a Defense Against Arguments from Evil

Author(s): Citron, Gabriel

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Abstract: This paper appeals to the phenomenon of dreaming to provide a novel defense against arguments from evil. The thrust of the argument is as follows: when we wake up after a nightmare we are often filled entirely with relief, and do not consider ourselves to have actually suffered very much at all; and since it is epistemically possible that this whole life is simply a dream, it follows that it is epistemically possible that in reality there is very little suffering. This epistemic possibility decisively undermines a key premise of both logical and evidential arguments from evil.
Publication Date: Jul-2015
Citation: Citron, Gabriel. (2015). Dreams, Nightmares, and a Defense Against Arguments from Evil. Faith and Philosophy, 32 (3), 247 - 270. 10.5840/faithphil20157641.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil20157641
ISSN: 0739-7046
Pages: 247 - 270
Language: English
Type of Material: Journal Article
Journal/Proceeding Title: Faith and Philosophy
Version: Final published version. This is an open access article.

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