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Abstract: | This paper appeals to the phenomenon of dreaming to provide a novel defense against arguments from evil. The thrust of the argument is as follows: when we wake up after a nightmare we are often filled entirely with relief, and do not consider ourselves to have actually suffered very much at all; and since it is epistemically possible that this whole life is simply a dream, it follows that it is epistemically possible that in reality there is very little suffering. This epistemic possibility decisively undermines a key premise of both logical and evidential arguments from evil. |
Publication Date: | Jul-2015 |
Citation: | Citron, Gabriel. (2015). Dreams, Nightmares, and a Defense Against Arguments from Evil. Faith and Philosophy, 32 (3), 247 - 270. 10.5840/faithphil20157641. |
DOI: | 10.5840/faithphil20157641 |
ISSN: | 0739-7046 |
Pages: | 247 - 270 |
Language: | English |
Type of Material: | Journal Article |
Journal/Proceeding Title: | Faith and Philosophy |
Version: | Final published version. This is an open access article. |
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