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|Abstract:||© 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the “punish-ment” for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. This may in-centivize hawkish policies like militarization and potentially offset the benefits of peace brokering. We study a model in which unmediated peace talks are effective at improving the peace chance for given militarization but lead to more militarization and ultimately to a higher incidence of war. Instead, a form of third-party mediation inspired by work of Myerson effectively brokers peace in emerged disputes and also minimizes equilibrium militarization.|
|Citation:||Meirowitz, A, Morelli, M, Ramsay, KW, Squintani, F. (2019). Dispute resolution institutions and strategic militarization. Journal of Political Economy, 127 (1), 378 - 418. doi:10.1086/700761|
|Pages:||1 - 41|
|Type of Material:||Journal Article|
|Journal/Proceeding Title:||Journal of Political Economy|
|Version:||Final published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.|
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