Skip to main content

Dispute resolution institutions and strategic militarization

Author(s): Meirowitz, Adam; Morelli, Massimo; Ramsay, Kristopher W.; Squintani, Francesco

To refer to this page use:
Abstract: © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the “punish-ment” for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. This may in-centivize hawkish policies like militarization and potentially offset the benefits of peace brokering. We study a model in which unmediated peace talks are effective at improving the peace chance for given militarization but lead to more militarization and ultimately to a higher incidence of war. Instead, a form of third-party mediation inspired by work of Myerson effectively brokers peace in emerged disputes and also minimizes equilibrium militarization.
Publication Date: Feb-2019
Citation: Meirowitz, A, Morelli, M, Ramsay, KW, Squintani, F. (2019). Dispute resolution institutions and strategic militarization. Journal of Political Economy, 127 (1), 378 - 418. doi:10.1086/700761
DOI: doi:10.1086/700761
ISSN: 0022-3808
EISSN: 1537-534X
Pages: 1 - 41
Type of Material: Journal Article
Journal/Proceeding Title: Journal of Political Economy
Version: Final published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.

Items in OAR@Princeton are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.