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The ECJ's Contribution to Europe's Democracy Deficit

Author(s): Fellmeth, Aaron

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dc.contributor.authorFellmeth, Aaron-
dc.date.accessioned2023-04-28T20:30:28Z-
dc.date.available2023-04-28T20:30:28Z-
dc.date.issued1996en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/pr1mk6580z-
dc.description.abstractOver the last half-decade the European Union's democracy deficit has become a topic of serious concern among scholars, politicians, the press, and the public. Commentaries inevitably focus on the Commission, the Council, or Parliament. This paper addresses the heretofore ignored question of how the European Court of Justice affects democracy in Europe. It argues that the Court's impact has been great on the extension of its own jurisdiction, on the jurisdiction of the European government, on the balance of power between member state governments and the European government, and on the distribution of power between appointed prime ministers and elected parliamentarians in the member states. The Court has repeatedly used procedurally undemocratic and extralegal methods, thereby significantly threatening the representativeness and responsiveness of public policy in Europe. The article advocates judicial restraint and a more open, accountable, and representative European Union.en_US
dc.format.extent1-29en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Public and International Affairsen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesVolume 7;-
dc.rightsFinal published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.en_US
dc.titleThe ECJ's Contribution to Europe's Democracy Deficiten_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.date.eissued1996en_US

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