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Negotiating Survival: The Problem of Commitment in U.S.-North Korean Relations

Author(s): Grunau, Steven

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dc.contributor.authorGrunau, Steven-
dc.date.accessioned2024-08-20T16:58:52Z-
dc.date.available2024-08-20T16:58:52Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/pr1m902358-
dc.description.abstractRational accounts of the causes of conflict provide an important framework to examine the dispute between the United States and North Korea over the latter’s nuclear weapons programs. Because North Korea depends on these weapons to ensure its survival, it is unwilling to irrevocably surrender its nuclear potential—and associated bargaining leverage—in exchange for U.S. security guarantees that could be withdrawn at any time. Arguing that neither confrontation nor engagement is likely to succeed in eliminating the North Korean threat, this paper advocates a longer-term strategy of integration as having the potential to alleviate some of the tensions in the bilateral relationship. By establishing alternative sources of economic and political power while simultaneously exposing Pyongyang to the pacifying influences of international interdependence, integration policies could gradually reduce North Korea’s threat, and perhaps eventually create the necessary conditions to negotiate the elimination of its nuclear weapons and missile programs.1en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Public and International Affairsen_US
dc.rightsFinal published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.en_US
dc.titleNegotiating Survival: The Problem of Commitment in U.S.-North Korean Relationsen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US

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