Non-Compliance and Ultimate Remedies under the WTO Dispute Settlement System

Abstract

This article examines the question of non-compliance and ultimate remedies under the WTO dispute settlement system. When two members have a trade dispute settled by the WTO, the dispute settlement body issues a formal binding ruling; however, if a member does not comply, final enforcement remains problematic. The WTO authorizes countermeasures to be taken by individual states. These retaliatory provisions, however, fail on many counts: on effectiveness; on defeating the foundational principles of the WTO, such as free trade; by causing “double-injury” to those who win the case; on being “the epitome of mercantilism”; and lastly, on favoring a power-based system and undermining the rule-based system of adjudication. Arguably, the WTO has the best dispute settlement system of any international organization. Nevertheless, the WTO does not have the best compliance system. Reform is an urgent necessity for the continued stability and predictability of the entire regime.