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|Abstract:||What exactly is the Eurocrisis a crisis of? Is it a currency crisis? A crisis of economic policymaking in Europe? Is it a crisis of a particular, expensive social model, as American conservatives like to claim? Or of the whole political project of European integration as it has been developing since the 1950s? The answer is, a bit of all of the above. In fact, it is a perfect political and economic storm, one that may still sweep away many accomplishments of the European Union—the greatest political innovation since the creation of the democratic welfare state. Even if the euro survives in its present form, the price millions of people will have paid for its preservation will be very high indeed. Quite apart from the economic disasters unfolding in Spain, Greece, and other countries, there have been less obvious but equally dangerous costs. The crisis has distracted elites from urgent political matters, above all, the rise of a new kind of illiberal politics in Eastern Europe. It has recreated political and cultural rifts between national elites long thought dead; it has also sown distrust and animosity between ordinary people. Not least, it leaves a deep sense of discontent and disillusionment with the European Union as such.|
|Citation:||Müller, JW. (2012). Europe's perfect storm: The political and economic consequences of the eurocrisis. Dissent, 59 (4), 47 - 53. doi:10.1353/dss.2012.0089|
|Pages:||47 - 53|
|Type of Material:||Journal Article|
|Version:||Final published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.|
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