The Myth of the Infallible Technocrat: Policy-Making in Mexico under the Salinas Administration

Abstract

The argument is often made that speedy and efficient imple­mentation of macroeconomic stabilization and structural re­form programs requires an insulated and sometimes authori­tarian decision-making process. Mexico's President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) not only supported this argu­ment but also believed that economic reform must be given priority over democratization. This article presents the case of Mexico as an example of the way in which autocratic policy­ making weakens democratic institutions. It posits that in countries where a tradition of an efficient bureaucracy is not deeply rooted, the centralization of economic and political power in the hands of a small group of technocrats severely undermines governmental accountability and the process of democratic consolidation. Futhermore, it can sometimes lead to disastrous consequences. The article argues that while the democratic process may slow the momentum of economic reform, it provides citizens with the best possible means of reaching decisions and holding the government accountable for its actions.