Hitting the Roof: Clinton's Medicare Prescription Drug Proposal and its Effect on R&D Incentives for Pharmaceuticals

Author(s): McCoy, John

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	McCoy, John	-
dc.date.accessioned	2024-10-31T17:24:00Z	-
dc.date.available	2024-10-31T17:24:00Z	-
dc.date.issued	2001	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/pr19p2w64v	-
dc.description.abstract	President Clinton's proposed prescription drug benefit for Medicare is examined with a view toward its effects on research and development incentives in the pharmaceutical industry. A simulation model based on Grabowski and Vernon's analysis of the 1984 Patent Term Restoration Act is developed. The model provides parameter-based estimates for patent extensions that might compensate pharmaceutical firms for various levels of price cuts. It also shows that any political tradeoff that tries to maintain R&D incentives by exchanging price cuts for patent extensions will run up against a fundamental limit. Policy considerations for alternate deals are discussed.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Public and International Affairs	en_US
dc.rights	Final published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.	en_US
dc.title	Hitting the Roof: Clinton's Medicare Prescription Drug Proposal and its Effect on R&D Incentives for Pharmaceuticals	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US

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