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The Instability of Freedom as Non-interference: The Case of Isaiah Berlin

Author(s): Pettit, Philip N.

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dc.contributor.authorPettit, Philip N.-
dc.identifier.citationPettit, P. (2011). The Instability of Freedom as Noninterference: The Case of Isaiah Berlin. Ethics, 121(4), 693-716. doi:10.1086/660694en_US
dc.description.abstractIn Hobbes freedom of choice requires non-frustration: the option you prefer must be accessible. In Berlin it requires non-interference: every option, preferred or un-preferred, must be accessible - every door must be open. But Berlin's argument against Hobbes suggests a parallel argument that freedom requires something stronger still: that each option be accessible and that no one have the power to block access; the doors should be open and there should be no powerful door-keepers. This is freedom as non-domination. The claim is that freedom as non-interference is an unstable alternative between freedom as non-frustration and freedom as non-domination. © Presses de Sciences Po. Tous droits réservés pour tous pays.en_US
dc.format.extent1 - 25en_US
dc.rightsFinal published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.en_US
dc.titleThe Instability of Freedom as Non-interference: The Case of Isaiah Berlinen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US

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