To refer to this page use:
|Abstract:||We quantify the effect of deliberation on the decisions of US appellate courts. We estimate a model in which strategic judges communicate before casting their votes and then compare the probability of mistakes in the court with deliberation with a counterfactual of no communication. The model has multiple equilibria, and preferences and information parameters are only partially identified. We find that there is a range of parameters in the identified set—when judges tend to disagree ex ante or their private information is imprecise—in which deliberation can be beneficial; otherwise, deliberation reduces the effectiveness of the court. © 2018 by The University of Chicago.|
|Citation:||Iaryczower, M, Shi, X, Shum, M. (2018). Can Words Get in the Way? The Effect of Deliberation in Collective Decision Making. Journal of Political Economy, 126 (2), 688 - 734. doi:10.1086/696228|
|Pages:||688 - 734|
|Type of Material:||Journal Article|
|Journal/Proceeding Title:||Journal of Political Economy|
|Version:||Final published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.|
Items in OAR@Princeton are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.