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Browsing by Author Weinberg, S Matthew

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Showing results 1 to 20 of 34  next >
Publication DateArticle TitleAuthor(s)
2020Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-ConsistenceSchvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew; Zlatin, Eitan; Zuo, Albert
2019Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via SymmetriesKothari, Pravesh; Singla, Sahil; Mohan, Divyarthi; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew
2018Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contractsKalodner, Harry; Goldfeder, Steven; Chen, Xiaoqi; Weinberg, S Matthew; Felten, Edward W
2020Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment TreesBahrani, Maryam; Immorlica, Nicole; Mohan, Divyarthi; Weinberg, S Matthew
2018Bitcoin: A Natural OligopolyArnosti, Nick; Weinberg, S Matthew
Jun-2017The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional BiddersEden, Alon; Feldman, Michal; Friedler, Ophir; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal; Weinberg, S Matthew
2018Computing Exact Minimum Cuts Without Knowing the GraphRubinstein, Aviad; Schramm, Tselil; Weinberg, S Matthew
2017Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament RulesSchneider, Jon; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew
Jul-2020Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic CommitmentsFerreira, Matheus V X; Weinberg, S Matthew
2020Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic TransactionsChang, Michael; Kaushik, Sid; Weinberg, S Matthew; Griffiths, Tom; Levine, Sergey
2017Discovering valuations and enforcing truthfulness in a deadline-aware schedulerHuang, Zhe; Weinberg, S Matthew; Zheng, Liang; Joe-Wong, Carlee; Chiang, Mung
Jun-2016A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism designCai, Yang; Devanur, Nikhil R; Weinberg, S Matthew
2020Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-HardCai, Linda; Thomas, Clay; Weinberg, S Matthew
2018The menu complexity of “one-and-a-half-dimensional” mechanism designSaxena, Raghuvansh R; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew
2019Multi-armed Bandit Problems with Strategic ArmsBraverman, Mark; Mao, Jieming; Schneider, Jon; Weinberg, S Matthew
2020New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function MinimizationGraur, Andrei; Pollner, Tristan; Ramaswamy, Vidhya; Weinberg, S Matthew
2018On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial AuctionsBraverman, Mark; Mao, Jieming; Weinberg, S Matthew
Jun-2019Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent itemsBeyhaghi, Hedyeh; Weinberg, S Matthew
Jul-2020Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded AgentsDevanur, Nikhil R; Goldner, Kira; Saxena, Raghuvansh R; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew
Jun-2017The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General CaseDevanur, Nikhil R; Weinberg, S Matthew