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Browsing by Author Schvartzman, Ariel

Showing results 1 to 7 of 7
Publication DateArticle TitleAuthor(s)
2020Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-ConsistenceSchvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew; Zlatin, Eitan; Zuo, Albert
2019Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via SymmetriesKothari, Pravesh; Singla, Sahil; Mohan, Divyarthi; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew
2017Coding in Undirected Graphs Is Either Very Helpful or Not Helpful at AllBraverman, Mark; Garg, Sumegha; Schvartzman, Ariel
2017Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament RulesSchneider, Jon; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew
2018The menu complexity of “one-and-a-half-dimensional” mechanism designSaxena, Raghuvansh R; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew
Jul-2020Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded AgentsDevanur, Nikhil R; Goldner, Kira; Saxena, Raghuvansh R; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew
Jun-2019Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated ValuesPsomas, Alexandros; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew