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Bargaining and the role of expert agents: An empirical study of final-offer arbitration

Author(s): Ashenfelter, Orley; Dahl, Gordon B.

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dc.contributor.authorAshenfelter, Orley-
dc.contributor.authorDahl, Gordon B.-
dc.date.accessioned2019-07-10T17:32:30Z-
dc.date.available2019-07-10T17:32:30Z-
dc.date.issued2012-02en_US
dc.identifier.citationAshenfelter, O, Dahl, GB. (2012). Bargaining and the role of expert agents: An empirical study of final-offer arbitration. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94 (1), 116 - 132. doi:10.1162/REST_a_00136en_US
dc.identifier.issn0034-6535-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/pr1p723-
dc.description.abstractExpert agents, such as lawyers, play a prominent role in conflict resolution, yet little is known about how they affect outcomes. We construct a model that permits us to estimate the influence of agents and test whether the parties in a dispute face prisoner's dilemma incentives. Using eighteen years of final-offer arbitration data from New Jersey, we find the parties do significantly better when they retain agents and that the parties learn about this benefit over time. However, we also find that the gain to using an agent is fully offset when the opposing party also hires an agent. Since agents are costly, this noncooperative equilibrium is Pareto inferior.en_US
dc.format.extent116 - 132en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofReview of Economics and Statisticsen_US
dc.rightsFinal published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.en_US
dc.titleBargaining and the role of expert agents: An empirical study of final-offer arbitrationen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.identifier.doidoi:10.1162/REST_a_00136-
dc.identifier.eissn1530-9142-
pu.type.symplectichttp://www.symplectic.co.uk/publications/atom-terms/1.0/journal-articleen_US

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