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The New Nuclear Threat: U.S. Post-Proliferation Policy in South Asia

Author(s): Tiffin, Andrew

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DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorTiffin, Andrew-
dc.date.accessioned2023-04-28T20:35:40Z-
dc.date.available2023-04-28T20:35:40Z-
dc.date.issued1993en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/pr12n4zh65-
dc.description.abstractWith the end of the Cold War and the reduced danger of strategic nuclear conflict, U.S. policy makers are now paying greater attention to a new type of nuclear threat nuclear proliferation. The appearance of new nuclear weapons states promises to usher in a more dangerous era of proliferation requiring a new type of policy. In contrast to arguments that "more may be better," this essay maintains that the introduction of nuclear weapons into certain regions may be destabilizing, and that this is especially so in the case of South Asia. India and Pakistan are now both de facto nuclear powers. The essay looks at a number of U.S. policy responses to this situation, ranging from diplomacy, to the transfer of stabilizing technology, to further U.S. efforts at strategic arms control.en_US
dc.format.extent12 - 38en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Public and International Affairsen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesVolume 4;-
dc.rightsFinal published version. Article is made available in OAR by the publisher's permission or policy.en_US
dc.titleThe New Nuclear Threat: U.S. Post-Proliferation Policy in South Asiaen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.date.eissued1993en_US

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