Browsing by Author Weinberg, S Matthew
Showing results 15 to 34 of 36
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Publication Date | Article Title | Author(s) |
---|---|---|
2020 | Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard | Cai, Linda; Thomas, Clay; Weinberg, S Matthew |
2018 | The menu complexity of “one-and-a-half-dimensional” mechanism design | Saxena, Raghuvansh R; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew |
2019 | Multi-armed Bandit Problems with Strategic Arms | Braverman, Mark; Mao, Jieming; Schneider, Jon; Weinberg, S Matthew |
2020 | New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function Minimization | Graur, Andrei; Pollner, Tristan; Ramaswamy, Vidhya; Weinberg, S Matthew |
2018 | On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions | Braverman, Mark; Mao, Jieming; Weinberg, S Matthew |
Jun-2019 | Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items | Beyhaghi, Hedyeh; Weinberg, S Matthew |
Jul-2020 | Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents | Devanur, Nikhil R; Goldner, Kira; Saxena, Raghuvansh R; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew |
Jun-2017 | The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case | Devanur, Nikhil R; Weinberg, S Matthew |
2020 | Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples | Rubinstein, Aviad; Wang, Jack Z; Weinberg, S Matthew |
2019 | Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality | Dughmi, Shaddin; Niazadeh, Rad; Psomas, Alexandros; Weinberg, S Matthew |
Nov-2019 | Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information | Azar, Pablo D; Kleinberg, Robert; Weinberg, S Matthew |
Oct-2018 | Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints | Daskalakis, Constantinos; Devanur, Nikhil R; Weinberg, S Matthew |
Jun-2015 | Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints | Daskalakis, Constantinos; Devanur, Nikhil R; Weinberg, S Matthew |
2018 | The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization | Gonczarowski, Yannai A; Weinberg, S Matthew |
May-2019 | Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities | Ferreira, Matheus X; Weinberg, S Matthew; Huang, Danny Y; Feamster, Nick; Chattopadhyay, Tithi |
Jun-2020 | Separating the communication complexity of truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctions | Assadi, Sepehr; Khandeparkar, Hrishikesh; Saxena, Raghuvansh R; Weinberg, S Matthew |
2021 | A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements | Eden, Alon; Feldman, Michal; Friedler, Ophir; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal; Weinberg, S Matthew |
Jun-2020 | A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer | Babaioff, Moshe; Immorlica, Nicole; Lucier, Brendan; Weinberg, S Matthew |
Jun-2015 | Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies | Devanur, Nikhil; Morgenstern, Jamie; Syrgkanis, Vasilis; Weinberg, S Matthew |
Oct-2018 | Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity | Rubinstein, Aviad; Weinberg, S Matthew |