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Browsing by Author Weinberg, S Matthew

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Showing results 15 to 34 of 36 < previous   next >
Publication DateArticle TitleAuthor(s)
2020Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-HardCai, Linda; Thomas, Clay; Weinberg, S Matthew
2018The menu complexity of “one-and-a-half-dimensional” mechanism designSaxena, Raghuvansh R; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew
2019Multi-armed Bandit Problems with Strategic ArmsBraverman, Mark; Mao, Jieming; Schneider, Jon; Weinberg, S Matthew
2020New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function MinimizationGraur, Andrei; Pollner, Tristan; Ramaswamy, Vidhya; Weinberg, S Matthew
2018On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial AuctionsBraverman, Mark; Mao, Jieming; Weinberg, S Matthew
Jun-2019Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent itemsBeyhaghi, Hedyeh; Weinberg, S Matthew
Jul-2020Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded AgentsDevanur, Nikhil R; Goldner, Kira; Saxena, Raghuvansh R; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew
Jun-2017The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General CaseDevanur, Nikhil R; Weinberg, S Matthew
2020Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from SamplesRubinstein, Aviad; Wang, Jack Z; Weinberg, S Matthew
2019Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of DualityDughmi, Shaddin; Niazadeh, Rad; Psomas, Alexandros; Weinberg, S Matthew
Nov-2019Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited informationAzar, Pablo D; Kleinberg, Robert; Weinberg, S Matthew
Oct-2018Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget ConstraintsDaskalakis, Constantinos; Devanur, Nikhil R; Weinberg, S Matthew
Jun-2015Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget ConstraintsDaskalakis, Constantinos; Devanur, Nikhil R; Weinberg, S Matthew
2018The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue MaximizationGonczarowski, Yannai A; Weinberg, S Matthew
May-2019Selling a Single Item with Negative ExternalitiesFerreira, Matheus X; Weinberg, S Matthew; Huang, Danny Y; Feamster, Nick; Chattopadhyay, Tithi
Jun-2020Separating the communication complexity of truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctionsAssadi, Sepehr; Khandeparkar, Hrishikesh; Saxena, Raghuvansh R; Weinberg, S Matthew
2021A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with ComplementsEden, Alon; Feldman, Michal; Friedler, Ophir; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal; Weinberg, S Matthew
Jun-2020A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive BuyerBabaioff, Moshe; Immorlica, Nicole; Lucier, Brendan; Weinberg, S Matthew
Jun-2015Simple Auctions with Simple StrategiesDevanur, Nikhil; Morgenstern, Jamie; Syrgkanis, Vasilis; Weinberg, S Matthew
Oct-2018Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue MonotonicityRubinstein, Aviad; Weinberg, S Matthew