Showing results 7 to 26 of 36
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| Publication Date | Article Title | Author(s) |
| Jun-2017 | The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders | Eden, Alon; Feldman, Michal; Friedler, Ophir; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| 2018 | Computing Exact Minimum Cuts Without Knowing the Graph | Rubinstein, Aviad; Schramm, Tselil; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| 2017 | Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules | Schneider, Jon; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| Jul-2020 | Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments | Ferreira, Matheus V X; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| 2020 | Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions | Chang, Michael; Kaushik, Sid; Weinberg, S Matthew; Griffiths, Tom; Levine, Sergey |
| 2017 | Discovering valuations and enforcing truthfulness in a deadline-aware scheduler | Huang, Zhe; Weinberg, S Matthew; Zheng, Liang; Joe-Wong, Carlee; Chiang, Mung |
| Jun-2016 | A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design | Cai, Yang; Devanur, Nikhil R; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| 2021 | A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design | Cai, Yang; Devanur, Nikhil R; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| 2020 | Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard | Cai, Linda; Thomas, Clay; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| 2018 | The menu complexity of “one-and-a-half-dimensional” mechanism design | Saxena, Raghuvansh R; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| 2019 | Multi-armed Bandit Problems with Strategic Arms | Braverman, Mark; Mao, Jieming; Schneider, Jon; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| 2020 | New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function Minimization | Graur, Andrei; Pollner, Tristan; Ramaswamy, Vidhya; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| 2018 | On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions | Braverman, Mark; Mao, Jieming; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| Jun-2019 | Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items | Beyhaghi, Hedyeh; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| Jul-2020 | Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents | Devanur, Nikhil R; Goldner, Kira; Saxena, Raghuvansh R; Schvartzman, Ariel; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| Jun-2017 | The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case | Devanur, Nikhil R; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| 2020 | Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples | Rubinstein, Aviad; Wang, Jack Z; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| 2019 | Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality | Dughmi, Shaddin; Niazadeh, Rad; Psomas, Alexandros; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| Nov-2019 | Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information | Azar, Pablo D; Kleinberg, Robert; Weinberg, S Matthew |
| Oct-2018 | Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints | Daskalakis, Constantinos; Devanur, Nikhil R; Weinberg, S Matthew |
