grams such as the hypersonic (e.g., Mach 5+) X-15 research aircraft, tailored "lifting body" orbital reentry shapes, lunar-landing flight simulators, and the approach and landing tests of the space shuttle *Enterprise*, which were a crucial step toward the fulfillment of the space shuttle program.

Peebles's work is not an integrated history, nor does it need to be: the Dryden Center has already been the subject of numerous historical studies, including my own (*On the Frontier*, NASA SP-4303 [Government Printing Office, 1984]). The excerpts are well chosen, and the recollections of the participants capture both the dramatic and the mundane qualities of high-tech aerospace research. The book features an excellent bibliography for those desiring further information and is well illustrated. *The Spoken Word II: Recollections of Dryden History, Beyond the Sky* is highly recommended for anyone seeking insight into the attitudes, mind-set, motivations, and workings of aerospace professionals laboring during the Cold War.

RICHARD P. HALLION

Heather Munro Prescott. *The Morning After: A History of Emergency Contraception in the United States*. (Critical Issues in Health and Medicine.) xi + 163 pp., illus., bibl., index. New Brunswick, N.J./London: Rutgers University Press, 2011. $22.95 (paper).

Heather Munro Prescott's new book on the history of emergency contraception in the United States is slim, engaging, and very assignable. *The Morning After* is the first history of emergency contraception to explore the 1960s roots of discussions over "postcoital contraception" or the "morning-after pill" (as it has also been known), neatly tying this history into contemporary debates.

Prescott's narrative begins with the quest by pharmaceutical companies and physicians for postcoital contraception as a key piece in the battle against the "disease of unwanted pregnancy"—especially in working-class populations. The first chemical substance successfully developed for this purpose was the synthetic estrogen diethylstilbestrol, or DES. Perhaps not surprisingly, university and college students around the country eagerly sought access to this new contraceptive. By 1971, however, DES—which had been prescribed starting in the 1940s to help women maintain difficult pregnancies—became implicated as a cause of vaginal cancer in the daughters of women who had used the drug while pregnant. Women quickly replaced DES with the Yuzpe method, in which an individual took several birth control pills (at first a combination of progesterone and estrogen) twelve hours apart within forty-eight hours of unprotected sex. This method remains unsanctioned by the FDA but was popular for decades—a result of simultaneous demand for increased access to emergency contraception coupled with concern about the hidden side effects of "official" drugs like DES.

Prescott argues that the effort to provide an FDA-approved emergency contraceptive method to members of the general public united women from a variety of political perspectives. Thanks to their efforts, "Plan B" became available in 2002 and was marketed on a national level (several alternatives are now available, as well). Prescott's history concludes with the ensuing battles for over-the-counter access to Plan B and similar products. Plan B can now be purchased without a prescription, but only if you are over the age of seventeen. Thus, access to emergency contraception is now largely mediated by pharmacists rather than doctors. Physicians and the FDA had to be persuaded that although the professional authority associated with prescription-based medicines has been eroding (not only in the case of emergency contraception), that was outweighed by the benefit to public health associated with the reduction of unwanted pregnancies.

The resulting partnership of the pharmaceutical industry with members of feminist health groups, Prescott suggests, embodied a far deeper rapprochement between thinking of contraception, including emergency contraception, as a medical solution to a population-level problem of unwanted pregnancy and considering the prevention of pregnancy a component of an individual woman's charge over her own bodily health. Although the emphasis on unwanted pregnancy as a demographic issue drove technical innovation for years, it focused on population control and kept emergency contraception prescription-based. Feminist advocates have pushed for over-the-counter access to emergency contraception in order to remove disparities in access, but even Plan B, like its more recent alternatives, is sold by only a small subset of drugstores.

The Morning After has a very focused narrative, which is both a weakness and a strength. Prescott does an excellent job of tying her story into existing histories of reproductive medicine and feminism in America (work on RU 486, for example), but because the book is so concise these links are brief and too often left me wishing there was more context. However, her nu-

anced and tight narrative also makes the book perfect for assigning to undergraduate students.

As a whole, Prescott has added an important facet to our understanding of reproductive science and medicine in the second half of the twentieth century by exploring the sometimes combative, sometimes collaborative relationship between the pharmaceutical industry, physicians, and female patients over access to emergency contraception.

ERIKA LORRAINE MILAM

Sharon K. Weiner. *Our Own Worst Enemy? Institutional Interests and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Expertise*. xiii + 358 pp., bibl., index. Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press, 2011. $27 (paper).

Between 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, and 2008 the United States spent over $1.2 billion trying to discourage the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons expertise from Russia, the Ukraine, and other Soviet successor states. A twofold strategy was adopted to stop weapons experts living under near-poverty conditions from migrating to countries like China, Iran, and North Korea: job creation and job conversion. The aim was to give a pool of skilled labor a stake in the future of their country and to reorient them toward civil production, in cooperation with private capital if possible.

Our Own Worst Enemy? Institutional Interests and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Expertise begins by defining the domestic contexts for the program in the United States and its erstwhile rival superpower. This is followed by four case studies, broken down by the administrative agency that was responsible for them—the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the Department of Energy (two studies). The emphasis is on institutional dynamics, decision-making processes, and congressional and presidential politics. Little information is given on the scientific and technological content of the programs undertaken. Sharon Weiner concludes that "although temporary salaries were provided for thousands of former Soviet WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] experts, few job creation or job conversion efforts succeeded" (p. 3). This relatively disappointing result is usually put down to a number of external constraints: insufficient funding, lack of coordination within the U.S. government, or lack of cooperation by Russia. Weiner highlights domestic factors that she believes are more important. Presidential commitment was uneven, except for a few years in Clinton's first term. Congress was divided over whether the nonproliferation initiative was about national security or foreign aid to an ex-enemy. But the biggest single obstacle, in her view, was that the three departments of the federal government that were involved in the initiative put their own institutional interests ahead of the programmatic goal of finding jobs for former Soviet WMD experts.

Historians of Soviet science in the late twentieth century will find useful accounts of the scale and the institutional and geographical distribution (including self-contained top-secret science cities) of the Soviet WMD complex. The system comprised some one million people, from weapons designers to janitors, of which about sixty thousand were regarded as top-level "experts of concern." It is striking to note that very few of these men and women left their country, despite the financial duress they lived under in the 1990s. Those that did emigrate went mostly to the West or to Israel, not to countries like Iran or North Korea, as U.S. officials feared. Of those who stayed, fewer than one in five of the "experts of concern" were permanently redirected away from weapons work. This suggests that historians of Russian or Ukrainian science who study the collapse of the Soviet Union are likely to find considerable continuity in practices and personnel, rather than any major rupture after 1991.

The State Department was responsible for the creation of science centers in Moscow and in Kiev. This program was enthusiastically promoted by Secretary of State James Baker and was supported by the European Union, Japan, and several other countries. Its aim was to provide financial support for weapons experts but also to integrate them, through joint projects, into the international scientific community. Most of the funding was for basic science. Each year some 100–150 projects were funded, to the tune of about $300,000 each. In fourteen years a little over $500 million was spent on the center in Moscow, considerably less in Kiev, with the U.S. share amounting to about 40 percent. Weiner stresses the significance that these programs had in building personal and institutional bonds, in transferring American values and concerns (notably regarding the dangers of proliferation), and in rendering transparent the previously closed Russian research system. Scientific cooperation is a potent instrument of American "soft power," she tells us (p. 301), but it can further U.S. national security goals only if it has strong support in Congress and in Russia itself. Today the attention of Congress is focused on terrorism, and Russia is reasserting its own interests. The opportunity to demilitarize the for-